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1. Assuming3,000pagesperfootand15millionpagespermile,theLOCcontains
approximately500milesofshelfandthusabout7.5billionpages.Thisaverages60pagesper
document,incontrasttotheJointSecurityCommission,whichin1994estimated3pagesper
classiﬁeddocument.ItakethistohavebeensupersededbytheDepartmentofEnergy,Analysisof
DeclassiﬁcationEﬀorts,12Dec.1996,http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/doerep.html,whichusesa
meanof10pagesperclassiﬁeddocument.
Removing Knowledge
Peter Galison
Introduction
Youmightthinkthattheguardedannalsofclassiﬁedinformationlargely
consist of that rare document, a small, tightly guarded annex to the vast
sumofhumanwritingandlearning.True,thenumberofcarefullyarchived
pages written in the open is large. While hard to estimate, one couldbegin
by taking the number of items on the shelves of the Library of Congress,
one of the largest libraries in the world: 120 million items carrying about
7.5 billion pages, of which about 5.4 billion pages are in 18million books. 1
In fact, the classiﬁed universe, as it is sometimes called, is certainly not
smallerandveryprobablyismuchlargerthanthisunclassiﬁedone.Noone
has any very good idea how many classiﬁed documents there are. No one
did before the digital transformation of the late twentieth century, and
now—at least after 2001—even the old sampling methods are recognized
tobenonsenseinanagewheredocumentsmultiplyacrosssecurenetworks
like virtual weeds. So we biblio-owls of Minerva are counting sheetsjustas
the very concept of the classiﬁed printed page fades into itseveninghours.
Undeterred,wemightbeginwitharelativelysmallsubsetofthewholeclas-
siﬁed world, about 1.6 billion pages from documents twenty-ﬁve years old
or older that qualify as historically valuable. Of these 1.6 billion pages, 1.1230 Peter Galison / Removing Knowledge
2. AccordingtotheAnnualReportforﬁscal2001:HarvardCollegeLibrary,elevenlibraries
includingWidener,netadded139,834volumesforﬁscal2001.LibrariansatHarvardestimate30
volumesperthreefeet,so10volumesperfootor300pagespervolume.Intheﬁscalyear2001it
contained8.9millionvolumes;thetotaluniversitylibrarysystemnetadded218,507volumestoa
totalof14.7millionvolumes.
billionhavebeenreleasedoverthelasttwentyyears,withmostopenedsince
Bill Clinton’s April 1995 Executive Order 12958. How many new classiﬁed
documents have been produced since 1978or so is much harder to esti-
mate—thecognoscentidisagreebyseveralordersofmagnitude—butthere
isn’t an expert alive who thinks the recent haul is anything less than much
larger than the previous twenty-ﬁve post–World War II years.
Some suspect as many as a trillion pages are classiﬁed (200 Libraries of
Congress). That may be too many. In 2001, for example, there were thirty-
three million classiﬁcation actions; assuming (with the experts) that there
are roughly10pagesperaction,thatwouldmeanroughly330millionpages
were classiﬁed last year (about three times as many pages are now being
classiﬁedasdeclassiﬁed).SotheU.S.addedanet250millionclassiﬁedpages
last year. By comparison, the entire system of Harvard libraries—over a
hundred of them—added about 220,000 volumes (about 60millionpages,
a number not far from the acquisition rate at other comparably massive
universaldepositoriessuchastheLibraryofCongress,theBritishMuseum,
or the New York Public Library). Contemplate these numbers: about ﬁve
timesasmanypagesarebeingaddedtotheclassiﬁeduniversethanarebeing
brought to the storehouses of human learning, including allthebooksand
journals on any subject in any language collectedinthelargestrepositories
on the planet.2
If that were typical—or at any rate the right order of magnitude—then
twenty-ﬁveyearsofsuchactionswouldyieldaveryroughﬁgureintherange
of 8billion pages since 1978 . The fact that the number has been growing is
nottothepoint—evenifitincreasedlinearlyfromzeroin1978toitscurrent
rate twenty-ﬁve years later, that would only divide the totalintwo,“down”
to 4 billion pages. Indeed, however one calculates, the number of classiﬁ-
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cation actions is increasing dramatically both as a result of a boosted de-
fense, intelligence, and weapons lab budget and because we are living in a
climateofaugmentedsecrecy.Figuredanotherway,thesupervisingagency,
the Information Security Oversight Oﬃce (ISOO), reports a total expen-
diture in 2001 of $5.5 billion to keep classiﬁed documents secure. The De-
partmentofEnergycostsarenowabout$0.30persecuredocumentperyear.
Estimatingbythiseconomicmeasure,wewouldﬁgurethatabout7.5billion
pages are beingkeptunderwraps—aclassiﬁedLibraryofCongresswithan
acquisition rate ﬁve times greater than the great library Thomas Jeﬀerson
bequeathed to this country over two centuries ago.
Onelastsetofnumbers:thereare500,000collegeprofessorsintheUnited
States—including both two- and four-year institutions. Of course there are
others—inventors, industrial scientists, computer programmers—respon-
sible for generating and conveying knowledge, especially technical knowl-
edge.Buttoﬁxideas,fourmillionpeopleholdclearanceintheUnitedStates,
plus some vast reservoir who did in the past but no longer do. Bottom line?
Whether one ﬁgures by acquisition rate, by holding size, or by contributors,
the classiﬁed universe is, as best I can estimate, on the order of ﬁve to ten
times larger than the open literature that ﬁnds its way toour libraries.Our
commonsense picture may well be far too sanguine, even inverted. The
closed world is not a small strongbox in the corner of our collectivehouse
ofcodiﬁedandstoredknowledge.Itisweintheopenworld—wewhostudy
the world lodged in our libraries, from aardvarks to zymurgy, we who are
living in a modest information booth facing outwards, our unseeingbacks
to a vast and classiﬁed empire we barely know.
One can trace the history of secrecy back to the ancient Babylonians
through medieval longbows and ﬁn de sie `cle invisible ink, from tightly
guarded formulae for Venetianglass-makingtothehiddenpouchesofdip-
lomatic couriers. Trade secrecy, state secrets, military secrets are all part of
the background to themodernsystem. Butthismodernsecrecysystemhas
its substantive start not in antiquity but in the vast infrastructureofWorld
War II. In part this new secrecy issued from the government, and yetinno
small measure it emerged in the hands of scientists themselves as they
launched a discipline of self-censorship on matters relating to thenucleus.
Out of the 2 billion dollar Manhattan Project anditssubsequentevolution
into the Atomic Energy Commission (now the Department of Energy)
came one sector of secrecy—with its twin classiﬁcation categories of Re-
stricted Data and Formerly Restricted Data (FRD), this lastforuninterest-
ing historical reasons covering military applications of nuclear weapons
rather than their productionordesign.Alongsidenuclearsecrecyarosean-
other fundamental category, National Security Information.232 Peter Galison / Removing Knowledge
3. See2001ISOOReporttothePresident,http://www.fas.org/sgp/isoo/2001rpt.html
4. See2002ISOOReporttothePresident,http://www.fas.org/sgp/isoo/2002rpt.pdf
5. U.S.DepartmentofEnergy,OﬃceofDeclassiﬁcation,“RestrictedDataDeclassiﬁcation
Decisions1946tothePresent,”RDD–7,1Jan.2001,http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/doe/rdd-7.
html;hereafterabbreviated“RDD.”
At the pinnacle of the National Security Information world is the pres-
ident who himself can classify or, more realistically, have his agency heads
classify.These agency headsinturndelegatethatpowertoarelativelysmall
numberofothers—justover4,000forthewholeoftheUnitedStates—who
bear the title of Original Classiﬁers. Only this initiatedcadrecantransform
a document, idea, picture, shape, or device into the modal categories Top
Secret, Secret, or Conﬁdential. And of these 4,132 or soOriginalClassiﬁers,
only 999 (as of 2001) are authorizedtostampadocumentintothecategory
Top Secret.3
Thosefewpeoplearetheunmovedprimemoversoftheclassiﬁedworld;
it is they who begin the tagging process that winds its way down the chain
of derivative classiﬁcation. For every document that subsequentlyrefersto
information in those originally classiﬁed gains the highest classiﬁcationof
the documents cited in it. Like the radio tagging of a genetic mutant, the
classiﬁedinformationbearsitsmarkthroughallthesubsequentgenerations
of work issuing from it. More numbers: in2001therewere260,678original
classiﬁcations(actsthatdesignatedabodyofworkclassiﬁed)and32,760,209
derivative ones.4 A cascade of classiﬁcation.
But there is another way for documents to become classiﬁed.Underthe
Atomic Energy Acts of 1946 and 1954, materials produced about nuclear
weapons–relatedactivitiesareexemptfromtheblessinghandsoftheOrigi-
nal Classiﬁers. Nuclear weapons knowledge is born secret. No primal act
ofclassiﬁcationisneeded,nomomentwhentheypassoutoflightintodark-
ness, no justiﬁcation, no term of expiration is needed to wrap them in the
protective blanket of restriction. Nuclear knowledgebecomesclassiﬁedthe
instant it is written down—even by someone who has no nuclearweapons
(Q) clearance. If I think of a new scheme for channeling X-rays from a ﬁs-
sion primary to a thermonuclear secondaryandwritethatideadown,Iam
(strictu sensu) forbidden from possessing the page I just created. (Techni-
cally, I could be arrested for espionage for reading or even possessing the
letters or pictures in my printer, on my screen, or under my pen.) And yet
inthis worldofnatalsecrecythereisasubtletybornintheholymatrimony
ofindustryandtheweaponslaboratories:anisotope-separatingtechnology
used to produce special nuclear materials such as U-235 or U-233. A sepa-
ration technique—in some sense the heart of nuclear weapons of massde-
struction—remains entirely in the open until just that moment when it
might demonstrate (as the Federal Register puts it) “reasonable potential
for the separation of practical quantities of special nuclear material.”5 AtCritical Inquiry / Autumn 2004 233
6. ArvinS.Quist,“SecurityClassiﬁcationofInformation,”2vols.,http://www.fas.org/sgp/
library/quist2/index.html,vol.2,chap.3;hereafterabbreviated“SC.”
7. SeeNationalResearchCouncil,AReviewoftheDepartmentofEnergyClassiﬁcationPolicyand
Practice(Washington,D.C.,1995),pp.7–8.
preciselythismomentofeﬃcacyitmorphsintoRestrictedData;asclassiﬁer
Arvin Quist puts it in a document addressed to his fellow guardians ofthe
faith, the separation technology becomes “classiﬁed only when it reaches
‘adolescence.’”6
In1995,theNationalResearchCouncilworkingwiththeDOEestimated
that the DOE’s born and adolescent classiﬁed documents numbered some
280 million pages—an amount that would take its current compliment of
reviewers9,000yearstoreview—if,againstreality,notalineofnewmaterial
were added.7 However incomplete it is now, this nine-millennium stack is
tentimeslargerthanthepreviousestimategivenafewyearsearlier.Needless
to say, neither the DOE nor any other agency has the budget, themandate,
ortheintentionofcatchingup.Inthelastfewyearstherateofclassiﬁcation
increasedﬁvefold,withnoendinsight.Secretinformationisaccumulating,
at a rate that itself is accelerating, far quicker than it is being declassiﬁed.
The Classiﬁed Theory of Knowledge
With such a vast reservoir of learning under wraps, the Department of
Energy must have—if not explicitly then at least implicitly—somesenseof
what can and cannot be released. What, we may ask, is the theory of inter-
dicting knowledge? Let us begin with a distinctionimposedsince1945,seg-
regating subjective from objective secrecy. Subjective secrets are said by
classiﬁerstodisplayﬁvekeycharacteristics—theyarecompact,transparent,
arbitrary, changeable, and perishable. Compact means they can be ex-
pressedverybrieﬂy;transparent,thattheyarereadilyunderstandable(“two
of the Abrams tanks are disabled”); changeable means that they typically
canberevised(“the101stAirbornewillconductitsﬁrstdropatﬁrstlight”);
and they are perishable (normally after some decent interval, forexample,
oncethe101sthaslandedthefactthattheydidsolosesitspotency).Objective
secrets are supposed to contrast with each of these qualities separately—
they are supposed to be diﬀuse, technical,determinable,eternal,andlong-
lasting qua secrets. That is, they may be far from expressibleinafewwords
(a theory of neutron diﬀusion involves integro-diﬀerential equations and
takesvolumes toexpresswhenitisputintouseableform);theymaynotbe
understandable to anyone without a technical training (no untrained ob-
server simply grasps the details of ﬂuorocarbon chemistry); they are sup-
posedtobedeterminableinsofarastheycanbededucediftherightquestion
is posed (the number of neutrons emitted in uranium ﬁssion canbefound
with enough eﬀort and equipment); and ﬁnally the objective secret is sup-234 Peter Galison / Removing Knowledge
posed to be in some sense unchangeable (in the limit case a law of nature
but, if not that, then least as unchangeable as the ﬁnely articulatedprocess
of preparing equipment against the corrosive eﬀects of uranium hexaf-
luoride). As such objective secrets are long-lasting secrets (see “SC,” vol.2,
chap. 2).
In important ways, objective secrets pose the more diﬃcult problem,
thoughsubjectiveonescanbequitedeadlyifexposed(LooseLipsSinkShips).
Particularmovementsorstrengthsoftroopsormaterielseemmorestraight-
forward. But to accomplish the goal of secrecy—the blocking of knowledge
transmission—is an extraordinarily diﬃcult task. And given the resources
devoted to it, it is perhaps worth inquiring just what its principles are.
Inotherwords,supposeweaskaboutthetransmissionofknowledgenot
by asking the usual social studies of knowledge question, How does repli-
cation occur? but instead by probing the staggeringly large eﬀort devoted
toimpedingthetransmissionofknowledge.AlreadybeforeAmerica’sentry
into World War II, nuclear scientists began a self-imposed banonpublish-
ing matters relating to nuclear ﬁssion. The eﬀect was immediate: Nazi sci-
entists spent the war struggling to moderate neutrons (slow them downto
the point where they were eﬀective in causing ﬁssion) using heavy water
(deuterium) rather thanthevastlymoreusefulgraphite.Thisself-imposed
muzzle continued through the war, issuing in the founding document of
modern secrecy, the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. That act released certain
parts of the basic chemistry and physics of materials including uranium,
thorium, and polonium but kept a lid on the details of a vast amount of
technical knowledge, including some basic physics. For example, in 1950 it
was permittedto saythattheimpactofaneutrononU-233,U-236,Pu-239,
or Pu-240 could release a gamma ray, but it remained forbiddentosayjust
how likely this reaction was. Only in 1956 wouldtheprocesstechnologyfor
producinguraniummetalandpreparingalloysofuraniumandthoriumbe
released. More indirectly, the cost of highly enriched uranium (about
$25,000/kg) was only declassiﬁed in 1955; presumably the mere quotation
of a price conveyed certain information about how it was done (ordinary
metallic uranium was running about $40/kg) (see “SC,” vol. 2, chap. 2).
Indeed, one of the most classiﬁed parts of the ﬁssionbombwasthepro-
cess bywhichhighlyenrichedmetallicU-235wasproduced.Itisinstructive
to follow the sequence of declassiﬁcation orders from 1946to1952showing
the gradual erosion of restriction on electromagnetic separation:
1946:Physicsofelectricaldischargesinavacuum,experimentaldataand
theory.
1946: “Electrical controls and circuits. . . . omitting reference to classiﬁed
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8. AssistantSecretaryofDefenseforCommand,Control,Communications,andIntelligence,
“DepartmentofDefenseHandbookforWritingSecurityClassiﬁcationGuidance,”DoD5200.1–
H,Nov.1999,http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/52001h_1199/p52001h.pdf,p.8;
hereafterabbreviated“DD.”
1947: “Experimental and theoretical physics of [electromagnetic sepa-
ration] provided they do not reveal production details or processes.”
1952: “Experimental and theoretical physics and chemistry, engineering
designs and operating performance ofsingleelectromagneticprocessunits
withoutidentiﬁcationascomponentsoftheElectromagneticProductionPlant”
(“RDD”).
Eachstepgavemoredetail,moreabouttheinternalwiringandconstruc-
tion of the machinery until, by the end, the major secret was simply the
label of the documents as being for the separation facility at Oak Ridge.
But perhaps the best way to grapple with the secrecy system is to follow
the instructions. Suppose you are an Original Classiﬁer at theDepartment
of Defense. The “Handbook for Writing Security ClassiﬁcationGuidance”
is your bible, and it begins byreviewingthevariousarenasofclassiﬁedma-
terial,fromweapons,plans,andcryptologytoscientiﬁc,technological,and
economic matters aﬀecting national security. Then you are to ask yourself
these questions. First, Is the information owned by, produced by or for, or
under the control of the United States government? If yes, then check that
the information falls in one of the regulated domains(suchascryptology).
If it still looks like a classiﬁcation candidate, then pose this question: Can
the unauthorized disclosure of the information reasonably be expected to
cause damage to the national security? And if the information is of thede-
structive type, then the acid test is this:
Whatisthelevelofdamage(“damage,”“seriousdamage,”or “excep-
tionallygravedamage”)tothenationalsecurityexpectedintheeventof
anunauthorizeddisclosureoftheinformation?Iftheanswertothis
questionis“damage”youhavearrivedatadecisiontoclassifytheinfor-
mationConﬁdential.Iftheansweris“seriousdamage,”youhavear-
rivedata decisiontoclassifytheinformationSecret.Iftheansweris
“exceptionallygravedamage,”youhavearrivedatadecisiontoclassify
theinformationTopSecret.8
You—the classiﬁer—should then designate the material secretfor aperiod
oftimelessthantenyearsor,foravarietyofreasons,youmaywanttojustify
an extension beyond ten years. Just a few of such reasons to carry on with
secrecy: revelation of hidden information that might assist in the devel-
opment of weapons of mass destruction, impair the developmentofaU.S.
weapon system, reveal emergency plans, or violate a treaty.236 Peter Galison / Removing Knowledge
Next in this antiepistemology you have to do what anyone pursuing a
more positive program would: establish the state of the art. This includes
of course publishedmaterialsin theUnitedStatesandabroadbutalso,and
moreproblematically,knownbutunpublishedmaterialincludingthatpos-
sessed by unfriendly countries. Byconsultingwiththeintelligenceservices,
you will want to ﬁnd out what the foreign knowledge is of unpublished
materials in the United States. All this, however, is preliminary. Havinges-
tablished what is known, you must identify how classiﬁcation will add to
the “net national advantage,” that is, “the values, direct and indirect, ac-
cruing or expected to accrue to the United States” (“DD,” p. 12). Such ad-
vantage might derive from the suppression of the factthatthegovernment
is interested in a particular eﬀort or that it has somethingin itspossession.
Orthecapabilities,performance,vulnerabilities,oruniquenessofanobject
(orbitofknowledge)thattheUnitedStateshas.Thenetnationaladvantage
might be in guarding surprise or lead time, manufacturing technology,or
associations with other data. The real heart of a classiﬁcation guide is the
identiﬁcation and enunciation of the speciﬁc items or elements of infor-
mationwarrantingsecurityprotection.Regardlessofthesizeorcomplexity
of the subject matter of the guide, or the level at which the classiﬁcation
guideisissued,therearecertainidentiﬁablefeaturesoftheinformationthat
create or contribute to actual or expected national security advantage.
Getting at those “special features or critical items of information” and
tyingthem tothe netnationaladvantageistheprimarytaskoftheclassiﬁer
(“DD,” p. 13). This is where the writer of the guide has to get inside the
information being hidden. The questions are subtle. “Are the counter-
countermeasures obvious, special, unique, unknown to outsiders or other
nations?” you should ask yourself. Or would knowledge of the counter-
countermeasures assist in carrying out new countermeasures?“What,”the
guide demands, “are the things that really make this eﬀort work?” (“DD,”
pp. 36–37). Here is the analysis of science and technology opened in many
of its aspects, all in the service of stopping the ﬂow of science. Itputsmein
mind of an experimental ﬁlm I once saw, a black-and-whitesixteen-milli-
meter production, printed in negative, all shot within a single room ﬁlled
with tripods and lamps.Aseachlightcame on,itcastblackoveritsportion
of the screen. Here is something similar. Understanding the ways inwhich
things work, are made, deployed, and connected are all used to interdict
transmission. Your job as a classiﬁer is to locate thosecriticalelementsthat
might lead to vulnerabilities—and then to suppress those that can be pro-
tected by classiﬁcation. The guide insists that secrets are not forever. You
must answer the question: how long can this particular secret reasonably
be expected to keep?Critical Inquiry / Autumn 2004 237
9. Secretaryof EnergyAdvisoryBoardwebsite,http://www.seab.energy.gov/sub/openpanl.html
10. SeeStevenAftergood,“GovernmentSecrecyandKnowledgeProduction:A SurveyofSome
GeneralIssues,”http://ciaonet.org/wps/rej02/rej02b.html
11. Seeibid.
Epistemology asks how knowledge can be uncovered and secured. An-
tiepistemology asks how knowledge can be covered and obscured. Classi-
ﬁcation,theantiepistemologyparexcellence,istheartofnontransmission.
Pressures to Declassify
With the end of the cold war in 1989–90—and the election of Bill Clin-
ton—the executive branch pressed the agencies to release some of the vast
troveofsecrets.SecretaryofEnergyHazelO’Learyannouncedon7Decem-
ber 1993 that the DOE had begun to “lift the veil of Cold War secrecy” and
to make visible some of the hidden data.9 Increasingly, scientists,scholars,
activists, and the DOE itself triedto displaceanethosinwhichjustiﬁcation
was needed to release information to one in which it required justiﬁcation
to keep information classiﬁed. The arguments for openness were several.
Cost was one—as I mentioned,some $5.5 billiongoesintomaintainingthe
secret storehouse. But that isn’t the only justiﬁcation. As the national se-
curityestablishmentitselfhaslongrecognized,overclassiﬁcationbreedsdis-
regardforclassiﬁcationprocedures.Seriousclassiﬁers(asopposedtoyahoo
politicians desperately looking to classify everythinginsight)wanttheare-
nasofrealsecrecytobeprotectedwithhigherwallsandthevastpenumbral
gray range to be open.
Back in 1970, the Defense Science Board Task Force on Secrecy, headed
by Frederick Seitz, argued to the secretary of defense that there was vastly
too much secrecy—and that even a unilateral set of disclosures was pref-
erable to the current system. An all-out eﬀort by the U.S. and the USSRto
control thermonuclear weapons failed utterly as the United Kingdom and
China followed soon on their heels. Conversely, when the nation decided
to open certain areas of technical research, the results were powerful. The
U.S. led in microwave electronics and computer technology, in nuclearre-
actorsbeginninginthemid-1950s,andintransistortechnology.10Examples
of secrecy gone amok are legion, including some $2.7 billion that sanklike
a stone into an unworkable special access program aiming to produce the
Navy A-12 attack aircraft. Secrecy contributed too in the protection of un-
workable programs like the one outﬁtted to build the Tacit Rainbow anti-
radar missile and the ($3.9 billion) Tri-Service Standoﬀ Attack Missile.11
Then there are the historians and journalists who clamor for access to
documents about the history of the national security state. These groups
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workers, soldiers, and ordinary citizens who have militated for a glimpse
of records about radiological contamination, test sites, radiological ex-
perimentation on humans, and nuclear working conditions. Scientists
themselves—especiallythosethenationallaboratorieswanttorecruitfrom
elite universities—want a degree of openness in which they can encounter
other ideas and publish their own. But my own judgment is that none of
these constituencies wouldhavemade eventhelimitedprogresstheymade
during the Clinton years had it not been for the insistence of industry de-
manding loud and clear that they no longer be excluded from the trove of
secret (objective) information. Declassiﬁcationmakesiteasierandcheaper
for industry to produce—and, needless to say, opens the vast civilian and,
withinthe constraintsofexportcontrols,thehugeforeignmilitarymarket.
Trade Secret Legitimacy
But within the secret world managing the ﬂood of data has presented
evergreaterproblems.Thereisanervousnessintheclassifyingcommunity,
a sense that the rising mountain of classiﬁed materials is unstable. Theab-
sence of a principled basis for classiﬁcation weighs heavily—and classiﬁ-
cation itself makes it hard to provide such a systematic understanding.
Need-to-knowcompartmentalizationleavesclassiﬁersindiﬀerentdomains
unable to communicate with one another, and each isolated branchforms
itsownroutinesofhiding.WhentheDepartmentofEnergycommissioned
Oak Ridge classiﬁer Quist to do a massive study of security classiﬁcation,
hecommentedthroughouthisseveralvolumereportthattheresimplywere
no principles on which classiﬁcation could be staked. And he wantedsuch
a foundation.
Trade secrets appeared to be the open society’s equivalent of national
security secrecy, and Quist—speaking both to and for the DOE—saw in
tradesecrecylawthepossibilityofestablishing,atlast,aground.Addressing
the army of classiﬁers, Quist put it this way:
Our legalsystem’srootsgobackmillennia,therebygivingthatsystema
solidfoundation.Tradesecretlawisapartofthatlegalsystem.Tradese-
cretlawhasdevelopedoverhundredsofyearsandhasbeenadistinct
areaofthelegalsystemforoveracentury—principlesoftradesecret
lawarewidelyaccepted.Becausetradesecretlawevolvedaspartofthe
“commonlaw,”ithasa ﬁrmbasisinourculture.Ourextensivebodyof
tradesecretlawhasbeendevelopedbyaveryopenprocess;thework-
ingsofourlegalsystemareessentiallycompletelyopentothepublic,
andthejudicialdecisionsontradesecretshavebeenextensivelypub-
lishedanddiscussed.Thus,tradesecretlawrestsonasolidfoundation,
isconsistentwithourculture,andisknown,understood,andaccepted
byourcitizens.[“SC,”vol.2,appendixA]Critical Inquiry / Autumn 2004 239
12. Thefollowingchartbuildson“SC,”vol.2,appendixA.
Establishing the isomorphism between the national security and trade se-
cret then became the order of the day. For this was the holy grail: theexact
mechanism for the Teller-Ulam idea, the scheme that ﬁrst made possible
the detonation of a true hydrogen bomb, would remain a ﬁercely guarded
secret—one for whichthegovernmentwaswillingtowageanall-outbattle
in court against the Progressive (a rather small left-leaning magazine that
printedanarticledescribingtherudimentsoftheTeller-Ulamscheme).The
DOE’s declassiﬁcation guide RDD-7 reports the guarded release in 1979 of
theideathisway:“Thefactthat,inthermonuclearweapons,radiationfrom
aﬁssionexplosivecanbecontainedandusedtotransferenergytocompress
andignite a physicallyseparatecomponentcontainingthermonuclearfuel.
Note: Any elaboration of this statement will be classiﬁed” (“RDD”). And so
it has remained for over half a century. Just such secrets, says Quist, ought
to be understoodbycomparison withtheholiestoftradesecrets,thatbest-
kept of all commercial formulae, “the recipe for Coca-Cola Classic has
been kept a secret for over one hundred years.ItissaidthatonlytwoCoca-
Colacompanyexecutivesknowthatrecipe[which]isinasafedepositbox
in Atlanta, which may be opened only by vote of the company’s board of
directors. . . . We probably would not know if a nationalsecuritysecretwas
as well-kept as the secret of Coca-Cola” (“SC,” vol. 2, appendix A).
Schematizing Quist’s argument, the parallelism between the secrets of
nukes and nachos might go something like this:12
Characteristic
National Security Secret
(Objective)
Trade
Secret
interest national security proﬁts
deﬁnition weapons-related “facts of
nature,” technical design
and performance of weap-
ons; method, process,
technique or device to cre-
ate a weapon
formula, pattern, compila-
tion, program, device
method, technique, pro-
cess that is of economic
value and derives its value
from secrecy
availability must in fact be secret must in fact be secret
knowledge inside
organization
must be distributed on a
need-to-know basis
must be distributed on a
need-to-know basis
secrecy measures
taken
U.S. v. Heine: exonerated
Heine on grounds that if
the U.S. had not protected
the (aviation) secrets in-
side the U.S. then could
not convict Heine for hav-
ing sent information to
foreign power
must take “reasonable”
measures that might in-
clude: restricted access,
“no trespassing” signs;
guards; restrictive cove-
nants; brieﬁngs; badges;
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value of information must have actual or poten-
tial military advantage.
must have actual or poten-
tial economic advantage
eﬀort to develop
secret
must constitute a suﬃ-
cient eﬀort such that this
investment in develop-
ment “is a factor in its
classiﬁcation”
must protect “the substan-
tial investment of employ-
ers in their propriety
information [trade se-
crets]”
eﬀort needed for
others to develop
must be such that the se-
cret be not readily ascer-
tainable by easy reverse
engineering, reference
books, trade journals, etc.
must be such that the se-
cret be not readily ascer-
tainable by easy reverse
engineering, reference
books, trade journals, etc.
former employees use classiﬁed solutions to
classiﬁed problems to
solve unclassiﬁed prob-
lems “outside the fence”
“former employees can
make use of general skills,
knowledge, memory if
they do not include . . .
‘special conﬁdential
knowledge obtained from
the employer which be-
longs to the employer’”
There are two fascinating aspects to Quist’s recourse to trade secretlaw.
First,ofcourse,istheformalstructure:heisabletodevelopalargelyparallel
structure between security and trade secrecy. But perhaps even more in-
teresting is a second feature. At the end of the cold war (the two volumes
appeared in 1989 and 1993 respectively) a senior classiﬁcation oﬃcercould
see security secrecy as in need of legitimation from something exterior to
the needs of the state. While the nuclear establishment could draw on the
1946 Atomic Energy Act and its successor legislation, trade secrecycarried
the weight of a long history. And while the Atomic Energy Act was largely
isolated from other bodies of law, and so much of the AEC’s own com-
portment was shrouded in secrecy, trade secrecy law (so Quist argued)
emerged from open judicial structures. Because it was hammered out on
the anvil of common law, it was part of the wider culture in ways that the
scientistandexecutive branch–createdAECneverwouldbe.Itishard,per-
hapsimpossible,toimaginethatsuchasearchforjustiﬁcationseemednec-
essary at the height of the cold war. Yet here is a case, made from insidethe
Department of Energy, for its secret practices to ﬁnd a grounding in the
legal ethos of the corporation.
Conclusion: Producing Ignorance
When the Establishment of Secrecy tries to block the transmission of
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whole domains of learning (nuclear physics, microwave physics), the ac-
cumulated mass of guarded data piles up at a smothering rate. It impedes
industry, it interferes with work within the defense establishment, and it
degrades the very concept of secrecy by applying it indiscriminately. Yet
whentheguardiansofsecretstrytopickandchoose,tohuntforthecritical
number, essential technique, or irreplaceable speciﬁcation, when they try
to classify this fact, that property, or those circumstances, they ﬁnd them-
selves in an impossible situation.Theyﬁndthemselvesstrugglingtohaltor
at least stall the spread of vital, large-scale sectorsofthetechnical-scientiﬁc
sphere through the protocol-driven excision of bits of language and tech-
nique. It is as if they want to make an image unreadable by picking oﬀ just
the vital pixels one by one. Indeed such a digital metaphor may be more
than allusive. Faced with the proliferation of electronicallyregistereddata,
thegovernmentisnowembarkingonamassiveeﬀorttorecruitAI(artiﬁcial
intelligence) to automate the classiﬁcation (and declassiﬁcation) of the ﬁ-
ber-optic pipes of digital secrets pouring out of the national laboratories
and their aﬃliates.
Philosophically, this puts us, oddly ﬂipped (and through a deadlypun),
inthefootstepsofearlytwentieth-centuryphilosophy,whenBertrandRus-
sellandtheyoungLudwigWittgensteinwerestrugglingtoarticulateavision
of language in which communication would be reduced to theassemblyof
isolated atomic propositions. These elemental bits of meaning “Red patch
herenow”or“Smellofozone12:00nooninthisroom”weretobeassembled
into the molecular and from then into ever more complexconcatenations.
The eﬀort failed back in the early 1900s because facts never did remain
withintheirconﬁnes;asevenitsstaunchestadvocateseventuallyconceded,
facts could not be deﬁned without theory, and theory, ever-spreading, re-
fused to congeal into the isolable knowledge-islandsofwhichseventeenth-
century natural philosophers dreamed.
For both practical and theoretical reasons, the atomic statementsofthe
2003 Department of Energy are no more likely than Russell’s atomicstate-
ments of 1903 to stay in their place. At some level, even the DOE and its
sister agencies know this. DOE exempts prototype developmentofisotope
separation technology from the maws of classiﬁcation because the DOE
desperately needs industrial and university-based work to produce each
nextgenerationofdevicesthatwillspewoutthespecialmaterialsfornuclear
weapons. Think of tunable die lasers. But then, just as the lasers actually
start sorting the U-235 from the U-238, the secrecy lid slams down and the
knowledge becomes adolescent classiﬁed. Too bad for us, though, because
the techniques, skilled operators, businesses, journal articles,andgraduate
students are by then on the hoof. Is it a surprise that the West Germans242 Peter Galison / Removing Knowledge
13. SeeThomasPynchon,TheCryingofLot49(1966;NewYork,1999).
(with no nuclear weaponsprogram)wereable(inthemid-1970s)toexport
the technology to apartheid SouthAfricawhichimmediatelybeganassem-
bling and eventually detonating a nuclear bomb? Or for that matter is it
reallyastonishingthatDOE’sclaimthattheycouldcontainanyelaboration
of the Teller-Ulam idea eventually failed?
Back in 1966 when Thomas Pynchon published his great Crying of Lot
49, he sketched a paranoid and disjointed society, a universe so obsessed
with concealment and conspiracy, with government and corporate mo-
nopoly control of information, that the causal structure and even the raw
sequence of events hovered perpetually out of reach. Now that the secret
world has begun to exceed the open one, Pynchon’s fantasy stands ever
nearer to hand. In the midst of his protagonist Oedipa Maas’s eﬀorts to
understand what is happening to her, she stumbles across a cryptogram
scrawledontoalatrinewall,inscribedintopostagestamps,present—ifone
looks carefully—just about anywhere. It was, as she soon discovers,theold
post horn, symbol of the late medieval Thurn and Taxis state monopoly
postal system. Butthere is atwist.Pynchon’sposthornhasamutejammed
into it; communication is blocked.13
Secretsocietieswithprivatecommunicationdesperatelytriedtocounter
themonopolyoninformation;Pynchon’sworldcrawlswithdisaﬀecteden-
gineers trying to patent Maxwell’s demon, would-be suicides, andisolated
loversallseekingtobreaktheout-of-controlmonopolyofknowledgetrans-
mission. Mad as it sounds, is it madder than it must feel to the radio as-
tronomers who discover thatimportantbitsofwhattheyknowabouttheir
best instruments have long been clear to the National Reconaissance Or-
ganization (NRO) and NSA? That one of the main objects of astrophysical
inquiry (gamma ray bursters) emerged not in the groves of academe but
throughsecreteﬀortstomonitorpotentialRussianviolationsoftheNuclear
Test-BanTreatyusingsatellitesbuilttoﬁndH-bombdetonationsonthefar
side of the moon?
Contra the logical positivists and their allies, it is precisely not possible
to reduce meaningful language to discrete enunciations. Communica-
tion—at least meaningful,veriﬁablecommunication—cannotberendered
intoasequenceofprotocolstatements.Butsuchaconceptionofknowledge
is exactly what lies behind the classiﬁers’ imaginary.Toblockthetransmis-
sionofknowledge—toimpedecommunicationaboutthemostdeadlyedge
of modern science and technology—the security services of the United
States (and for that matter NATO, the Warsaw Pact, China, and dozens ofCritical Inquiry / Autumn 2004 243
other countries) have chosen to list facts, circumstances, associations,and
eﬀects that would be banned from utterance.
At the root of this theory of punctiform knowledge excision stands a
fundamental instability.Totrulycover an arenaofknowledgeoneisdrawn
ever outwards, removing from the public sphere entire domains until one
is in fact cutting out such a vast multiple of the original classiﬁcationthat
the derivative censorship covers 330 million pages per year—and growing.
Even that number is one kept “low” by beating down theclassiﬁeddomain
byitsinverse—theclassiﬁcationofparticularpoints.Butthenoneiscaught
in the manifestly peculiar position of trying to stanch knowledge ﬂow by
punctiform excision.
On the one side, an unaﬀordable, intractable, holist antiepistemology,
on the other a ludicrously naive punctiform one. If this were just a theo-
retical matter it would be fascinating but delimited. It is not. At stake for
the national security establishment is the broad interferencethatcompart-
mentalizationiscausing,manifestmostrecentlyintheworld-changingfail-
uresofintelligenceleadingupto9/11andweaponsofmassdestructionthat
were or weren’t in Iraq. Industry chafes under the restriction of classiﬁca-
tion, and vast resources are needed to defend excessive retention of infor-
mation. For universities the eﬀects of the new order of secrecy are just
beginning to be felt. The Patriot Act restricts laboratory access to people
coming from certain countries—a direct clash with universities’ own stat-
utesthatexpresslyforbiddenyingaccesstocertaincategoriesoflaboratories
onthebasisofrace,creed,ornationalorigin.Morebroadly,forallthecon-
ceptual and practical problems with classiﬁcation behind the fence at Los
Alamos or Livermore, the problem of restricting research in the open uni-
versity may be far greater. But it is not just the rights and culture of uni-
versitiesthatareatstake.Billionsofdollarshavebeenspentonprojectsthat
scientiﬁcally or technically would nothave—couldnothave—survivedthe
gimlet-eyedscrutinyofinternationalandopenreview.Whatevertheirstra-
tegic use or uselessnessmighthavebeen,theatomicairplaneandtheX-ray
laserwerenotjustoverbudget,theywereoveradoomedsetofassumptions
about science and technology.
Intheend,however,thebroadestproblemisnotmerelythatoftheweap-
ons laboratory, industry, ortheuniversity.Itisthat,ifpressedtoohardand
too deeply, secrecy, measured in the staggering units of Libraries of Con-
gress, is a threat to democracy. And that is not a problem to be resolvedby
an automated Original Classiﬁer or declassiﬁer. Itispoliticalateveryscale,
from attempts to excise a single critical idea to the vain eﬀorts to remove
whole domains of knowledge.